Qualitative Physics in a Metaphysical Perspective

Abstract

The article deals with the problem concerning the possibility of qualitative physics paradigm development and its close connection with metaphysics. The idea of qualitative physics is based on the principles of Aristotelian physics and is opposed to quantitative modern physics (classical and non-classical). It is stated that the essential difference between the two physical paradigms lies in the ways of describing physical objects. Qualitative physics presuppose the qualitative description of physical objects independent of their quantitative description. In normal nowadays physics, on the contrary, physical objects are regarded to be fully determined through quantitative (numerical and structural-analytical) relationships with other objects. The statements of modern physics are considered reasonable if they can be self-consistently expressed by the apparatus of mathematics. The article shows that this way of describing and explaining physical reality is incomplete. There is ground to assert that the quantitative relations of physical objects do not encompass everything that exists in the relations of physical objects. It is argued that there are qualitative aspects of physical reality that are not defined quantitatively and may become the content of special qualitative physics. The conclusion is made that such qualitative physics in its principles and language must be close to traditional metaphysics and can appear to be an application of metaphysics to the field of physical reality.