Metaphysical Foundationalism: a New Form of Justification

Aleksandr Kulieshov

Abstract

A new set of metaphysical arguments in favour of fundamental reality is proposed in the article. For this purpose the notion of the state of the world is introduced. The standard concept of grounding underlying metaphysical foundationalism is taken into account. The correspondence of the new notion and the initial principles of metaphysical fundamentalism are confirmed. The proof of fundamental reality existence is represented based on formulated principles and empirical data.

 




Keywords


metaphysical fundamentalism; grounding relation; entity; state of the world; fundamental reality.

Full Text:

PDF


References


References

1. Audi, P. (2012). A clarification and defense of the notion of grounding. In F. Correia, & B. Schnieder (Eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (pp. 101–121). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2. Bliss, R. (2012). Against Metaphysical Foundationalism (Doctoral thesis, University of Victoria). Retrieved from https://sites.google.com/site/rickibliss/home/research

3. Cameron, R. P. (2008). Turtles all the way down: Regress, priority and fundamentality. Philosophical Quarterly, 58(230), 1–14. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.509.x

4. Daly, Ch. (2012). Scepticism about Grounding. In F. Correia, & B. Schnieder (Eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (pp. 81–100). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5. Dasgupta, Sh. (2014). On the Plurality of Grounds. Philosophers' Imprint, 14(20), 1–28.

6. Dixon, T. S. (2016). What Is the Well-Foundedness of Grounding? Mind, 125(498), 439–468. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzv112

7. Fine, K. (2012). Guide to Ground. In F. Correia, & B. Schnieder (Eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (pp. 37–80). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

8. Jenkins, C. S. (2011). Is Metaphysical Dependence Irreflexive? The Monist, 94(2), 267–276. doi: 10.5840/monist201194213

9. Koslicki, K. (2013). Ontological Dependence: An Opinionated Survey. In B. Schnieder, M. Hoeltje, & A. Steinberg (Eds.), Varieties of Dependence: Ontological Dependence, Grounding, Supervenience, Response-Dependence (Basic Philosophical Concepts) (pp. 31–64). Munich: Philosophia Verlag.

10. Ladyman, J., & Ross, D. (2007). Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

11. McKenzie, K. (2011). Arguing against fundamentality. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 42(4), 244–255. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsb.2011.09.002

12. Raven, M. J. (2012). In Defence of Ground. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90(4), 687–701. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2011.616900

13. Raven, M. J. (2015). Ground. Philosophy Compass, 10(5), 322–333. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12220

14. Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2015). Grounding is not a strict order. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1(3), 517–534. doi: 10.1017/apa.2014.22

15. Rosen, G. (2010). Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction. In B. Hale, & A. Hoffmann (Eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology (pp. 109–136). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

16. Schaffer, J. (2003). Is there a fundamental level? Noûs, 37(3), 498–517.

17. Schaffer, J. (2009). On what grounds what. In D. Manley, D. J. Chalmers, & R. Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (pp. 347–383). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

18. Schaffer, J. (2010). Monism: The Priority of the Whole. Philosophical Review, 119(1), 31–76. doi: 10.1215/00318108-2009-025

19. Schaffer, J. (2012). Grounding, transitivity, and contrastivity. In F. Correia, & B. Schnieder (Eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (pp. 122–138). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

20. Wilson, J. M. (2012). Fundamental determinables. Philosophers' Imprint, 12(4), 1–17.


Список информационных источников

1. Audi P. A clarification and defense of the notion of grounding. Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality / eds. F. Correia, B. Schnieder. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2012, P. 101–121.

2. Bliss R. Against Metaphysical Foundationalism : doctoral thesis, University of Victoria. URL: https://sites.google.com/site/rickibliss/home/research

3. Cameron R. P. Turtles all the way down: Regress, priority and fundamentality. Philosophical Quarterly. 2008. № 58(230). P. 1–14. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.509.x

4. Daly Ch. Scepticism about Grounding. Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality / eds. F. Correia, B. Schnieder. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. P. 81–100.

5. Dasgupta Sh. On the Plurality of Grounds. Philosophers' Imprint. 2014. № 14(20). P. 1–28.

6. Dixon T. S. What Is the Well-Foundedness of Grounding? Mind. 2016. № 125(498). P. 439–468. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzv112

7. Fine K. Guide to Ground. Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality / eds. F. Correia, B. Schnieder. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. P. 37–80.

8. Jenkins C. S. Is Metaphysical Dependence Irreflexive? The Monist. 2011. № 94(2). P. 267–276. doi: 10.5840/monist201194213

9. Koslicki K. (2013). Ontological Dependence: An Opinionated Survey. Varieties of Dependence: Ontological Dependence, Grounding, Supervenience, Response-Dependence (Basic Philosophical Concepts) / eds. B. Schnieder, M. Hoeltje, A. Steinberg. Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 2013. P. 31–64.

10. Ladyman J., Ross D. Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 359 p.

11. McKenzie, K. Arguing against fundamentality. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. 2011. № 42(4). P. 244–255. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsb.2011.09.002

12. Raven M. J. In Defence of Ground. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 2012. № 90(4). P. 687–701. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2011.616900

13. Raven M. J. Ground. Philosophy Compass. 2015. № 10(5). P. 322–333. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12220

14. Rodriguez-Pereyra G. Grounding is not a strict order. Journal of the American Philosophical Association. 2015. № 1(3). P. 517–534. doi: 10.1017/apa.2014.22

15. Rosen G. (2010). Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction. Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology / eds. B. Hale, A. Hoffmann. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. P. 109–139.

16. Schaffer J. Is there a fundamental level? Noûs. 2003. № 37(3). P. 498–517.

17. Schaffer J. (2009). On what grounds what. Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology / eds. D. Manley, D. J. Chalmers, R. Wasserman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. P. 347–383.

18. Schaffer J. Monism: The Priority of the Whole. Philosophical Review. 2010. № 119(1). P. 31–76. doi: 10.1215/00318108-2009-025

19. Schaffer, J. (2012). Grounding, transitivity, and contrastivity. Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality / eds. F. Correia, B. Schnieder. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2012. P. 122–138.

20. Wilson J. M. Fundamental determinables. Philosophers' Imprint. 2012. № 12(4). P. 1–17.


Article Metrics

Metrics Loading ...

Metrics powered by PLOS ALM

Refbacks

  • There are currently no refbacks.




Copyright (c) 2016 A. Kulieshov

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.