

State Reconstruction Initiatives of the African Union Mission in Somalia (2007-2022)

Dennis Kiptoo Kandie ¹, Xavier Francis Ichani ¹, Evans Odhiambo Onyango ¹

¹ *Kenyatta University*

P. O. Box 43844-00100, Nairobi, Kenya

DOI: [10.22178/pos.116-20](https://doi.org/10.22178/pos.116-20)

JEL Classification: *K40*

Received 28.03.2025

Accepted 28.04.2025

Published online 30.04.2025

Corresponding Author:

Xavier Francis Ichani

ichani.xavier@ku.ac.ke

© 2025 The Authors. This article is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) 

Abstract. State reconstruction by international actors, individually or collectively, has been a diagnostic framework for Peace Support Operations outcomes and states' vulnerabilities to conflicts or failed states. This study interrogated the state reconstruction initiatives of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This study employed a case study research design using a sample size of 62 informants determined purposively. The researchers presented the analysed data qualitatively. Using the state-building, securitisation and intervention theories to underpin the discourse of AMISOM's intervention, the study observed numerous initiatives employed by AMISOM. They included stabilisation initiatives, civilian protection, civil-military cooperation, counter-terrorism, and gender-based initiatives. Further initiatives were on security, humanitarian action and institutional capacity building. Generally, these initiatives positively impacted Somalia's statehood strides. The study recommends that military interventions, such as AMISOM, should prioritise state reconstruction initiatives in their mandate. Further, African Union-United Nations (AU-UN) partnerships on state reconstruction initiatives should develop sustainable strategies enabling stakeholders to achieve the stipulated mission mandates.

Keywords: AMISOM; state reconstruction; mandate; military intervention; peace support operations; protection of civilians.

INTRODUCTION

State reconstruction by international actors, individually or collectively, has become a diagnostic framework for any global community intervention due to existing vulnerabilities of conflicts in failed, collapsed or dysfunctional states [1]. State reconstruction is defined as the holistic re-establishment of political authority with control over state boundaries and territory to achieve government functions and the capacity of political authority in resource extraction from international and domestic environments for political, economic and social welfare [2]. Military intervention in state reconstruction aims to achieve its mandate within the international legal framework, focusing on the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) doctrine [3], which begins with forestalling hostilities before other human insecurities are addressed.

In recognition of the African Solutions to African Problems, the United Nations (UN) formally recognised that the African Union could contribute

to state reconstruction in Somalia. With UN authorisation, the African Union, therefore, established the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to replace the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) in compliance with UN resolution 1744/2007 [4]; this was by the 2007 Status of Mission Agreement between AU and Somalia. The rationale of the intervention was to assist in the national reconciliation process and provide a report within 2 months on the possibility of a peacekeeping mission by the UN [5].

In 2014, the UN gave a go-ahead to the AU via AMISOM to proceed with its mandate in Somalia until November 30 2015 (UNSCR 2182/2014). The United Nations further authorised AMISOM to implement "all measures in carrying out support for reconciliation and dialogue by aiding with safe passage, protection of civilians involved in the reconciliation process and facilitating their movement as well as the protection and move-

ment of all other stakeholders [6]. UNSC also issued Resolution 2372/2017, which enabled security mandates to be gradually handed over to the Somali forces by AMISOM. It was also cognizant of the Somali force's ability and progress on Somalia's political and security fronts [6].

State reconstruction was poised to benefit from the peace support operations through joint efforts of AMISOM troops and international agencies as Somalia reconstructs its government and organs. The African Union and its partners achieved several milestones through joint initiatives and strategic partnerships. Some sense of law and order, stability, reconciliation and legitimacy in Somalia was restored [7]. In equal measure, business and economic activities gained life and good cooperation and collaboration between the Government of Somalia and neighbouring/regional states [7]. The government and the opposition also increased their dialogue to promote state-building and progress. The empowered security forces were now in a much better place to counter terrorist attacks from Al-Shabaab. They could fully command the country's national security with backup from AMISOM [8]. Al-Shabaab were displaced from the major population vicinities in the entire South-Central Somalia by AMISOM troops [9].

Based on these actions, AMISOM achieved its mandate of protecting two transitional regimes, two federal regimes, and two national electoral processes [7]. AMISOM successfully created a political atmosphere for Somalia's leadership to address their key national challenges related to governance, reconciliation and state reconstruction [10]. AMISOM also helped establish the conditions for multiple external actors to return to Somalia and initiate state reconstruction through strategic partnerships. AMISOM's harsh critics concede that these progressive developments could be impossible without its effort [7]. However, it is unclear if all these achievements resulted from AMISOM's presence in Somalia.

The fragile Somalia has to regain its stability and a lasting solution to the more than three decades of conflict and state collapse through state reconstruction initiatives. The unprecedented failures of interventions in Somalia are huge gaps that need prompt and deeper inquiries. Therefore, this calls for proper intervention within the academic and policy realms to foster sustainable state reconstruction in the Federal Republic of Somalia.

Statement of the problem. The situation in Somalia continues to be an existential threat to regional, continental and global stability. Despite several state reconstruction initiatives in Somalia by the international community, Somalia has never been able to holistically re-establish its political, economic and social authority with absolute control over state boundaries and territory to achieve the functions of states as enshrined in international law and norms. In line with the aspirations of the African Union and its strategic partners, the African Union mandated AMISOM to ensure the sustainable reconstruction of the Somali state. However, during its tenure, AMISOM failed to attain what was largely anticipated by the international community as the ultimate solution to the restoration of the Somali nation and the liberation of its people from the brutal hands of warlords, terrorist groups and negative clannism. Although observers partially evidenced AMISOM's successes within its mandate through development-oriented programs and peace-building in Somalia, the African Union and its partners should have better tailored their efforts to state reconstruction initiatives. Historical trajectories pinpoint AMISOM as a multi-dimensional mission which struggled to meet its complex and ever-changing mandates as advanced by the African Union and the United Nations.

METHOD

The study applied a case study research design. The design was suitable because it provided grounds for an in-depth and comprehensive investigation of AMISOM on Somalia's state reconstruction [11]. The design was most appropriate and reliable because it offered a thorough, in-depth analysis that gave valuable insights into the investigation [12]. This study was conducted in Mogadishu in the Banaadir region of the Federal Republic of Somalia on the Indian Ocean Coast [13]. Mogadishu is Somalia's official capital and a key commercial centre on the East African coastline. Mogadishu has a population of close to 2,610,483 [14]. Mogadishu is highly fragile and has a legacy of protracted conflicts and wars revolving around the politics of unbalanced elite bargaining and hanging constitutional transitional frameworks [15]. This study targeted relevant key informants in academic and professional spectra, particularly those with knowledge, intellectual base, experience, and, more im-

portantly, expertise in state reconstruction. The study further targeted Somali elders, Somali political and business elites, Somali political leadership, Somali diaspora community, and Somali NGOs. The purposive sampling allowed the researcher to focus on specific features of a population they were interested in, providing an informed way to answer the research questions. Purposive sampling is preferred for a study in selecting particularly informative cases [15, 16].

In determining the sample size, this study relied on the precedents advanced by authors [17-19]. The researchers determined the number of key informants based on the types of analysis proposed. Qualitative studies often require few participants to describe their experiences or knowledge [20]. This study emphasised theoretical saturation by obtaining a clear understanding by proceeding to sample until no newer data were attained [21]. Using key informants was essential and ideal for targeting the desired and reliable population. The researchers selected a sample of 62 key informants from various target groups for the study. They collected both primary and secondary data. Primary data came from interviews with key informants conducted physically and online. An interview schedule incorporating structured and unstructured questions enabled comprehensive responses. The study employed a systematic approach to ensure exhaustive data collection aligned with research objectives. The researchers gathered secondary data through documentary analysis, systematically reviewing and interpreting existing records to draw meaningful conclusions.

The research team analysed data using content analysis, documentary reviews, and theoretical reflections. Content analysis involved data preparation, categorisation, coding, inference-making, and methodological reporting. Interview data were transcribed, organised thematically, and categorised to streamline diverse responses into relevant attributes for the conclusion. The researchers presented the findings thematically. On theoretical frameworks, state-building, securitisation, and intervention theories were used to analyse AMISOM's intervention in Somalia. Documentary analysis played a crucial role in triangulation, examining secondary sources.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Stabilisation Initiatives. The UN recognised the contention that AMISOM could meaningfully contribute to Somalia's stabilisation after the failure of numerous international attempts in 2007 [9]. The UNSC agreed with the recommendations to improve the security situation in Mogadishu and formally requested AMISOM to partner with the Somali administration to develop a comprehensive stabilisation strategy for Mogadishu [22]. The UNSC also acknowledged the significant role of an effective police presence that could contribute towards stabilising Mogadishu and emphasised the need to establish a reliable Somali police force. For this reason, the UNSC authorised the African Union's strategy to develop a component that constitutes a police force within the structures of AMISOM [23]. UNSC Resolution 2036/2012 stipulated that AMISOM was to support the delivery of stabilisation plans developed by the IGAD and the Somali TFG in areas it had already secured. It further called for AMISOM to create a police component to stabilise Mogadishu. The United Nations further mandated AMISOM to authorise the current government to stabilise areas that Al-Shabaab previously occupied, and shifted AMISOM into a supporting role in UN Resolution 2093/2013.

In 2011, AMISOM and TFG effectively removed Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and other strategic towns of Kismayo, Beledweyne and Baidoa in South-Central Somalia. Also, they merged 4,000 Personnel drawn from the Kenyan military into the wider AMISOM family in Somalia [10]. The initiatives of AMISOM at the beginning of 2012 revolved around the recovery and stabilisation of settlements in South-Central Somalia that were under the control of Al-Shabab. The success of stabilisation initiatives needed military involvement to support a politically viable strategy; this was complex to attain when the military and political aspects of stabilisation were disagreeing/conflicting and executed by different uncoordinated players. AMIOM recovered many settlements from Al-Shabab between 2014 and 2015. Regrettably, there was no effective holding of uniformed personnel or an interim governance structure to stabilise them. Both the military and political components were required. It is traditionally a political obligation to develop effective local security sectors and non-violent political processes, which need a degree of military jurisdiction. AMISOM, as an army component, could not deliver a stabilisation agenda alone be-

cause the UNSC configured it to counter-terrorism and counter-offensive operations [24]. Stabilisation in Somalia needed police and civilian components that were effective and capable, which, unfortunately, neither AMISOM nor the Somali administration possessed. Initially, AMISOM did not have police or civilians permanently outside Mogadishu city. Equally, Somali authorities did not have an effective "holding" force and civilian administration to deliver a peace dividend to the population living in these settlements.

With the increased scope of the AMISOM mandate in 2014, the FGS was able to develop a stabilisation plan before the commencement of Operation Eagle [13]. The 2014 stabilisation plan for Somalia aimed to coordinate between Somalia's Interior Ministry and the Federal administrations in Somalia (FGS). This stabilisation plan, however, was not factored into the AMISOM military operations. As a result, the internal FGS stabilisation initiatives were carried out in isolation from the larger AMISOM stabilisation processes. The components of the AU's policy focused inherently on state-building as a broader concept of stabilisation [13]. Therefore, AU peace support operations have primarily focused on stabilising regimes in Africa. This focus and assumption hindered AMISOM from creating a clear, comprehensive, cohesive stabilisation strategy needed for Somalia.

In 2015, AMISOM, in partnership with SNA through "Operation Jubba Corridor", was able to dislocate the Al-Shabaab from the Gedo, Bakool, and Bay regions of Somalia between the Ethiopian and Kenyan borders [25]. AMISOM Operations' main goal was to destroy, secure and consolidate, ultimately resulting in stabilisation. According to a press release by AMISOM on an update on the operation in Mogadishu on July 25 2015, AMISOM further recovered from the Al Shabaab key strategic town of Bardhere and villages in Gedo regions, namely Duraned, Habakhaluul, Taraka, Magalay, Eel-elaan, Jungal and Meyon. In the Bakool region, the operation led to more recovery in areas such as Legaly, Buur-Duhunle, Moragabey, Kulun-career, and Gelewoyni. Further, the liberation of Dhargo Ufurow, Liidaale, Makoon, Hasanow-Mumin, Eesow and Manaas in the Bay region resulted from Jubba Operations [25]. Informants interviewed believed that "Operation Jubba Corridor" led to stabilisation and limited Al Shabbabs' capabilities in

revenues, human resources and territorial control.

In a bid to further stabilise Somalia, AMISOM demined vital roads such as the roads linking areas of Baidoa, Manaas, Farnooley, Raxoole, Dinsor, Barow, Qansax Dheere, Buulo bilaan, Cilaan, Bardhere, Bakhtiti, Faafax duum, Tawakal. The Al Shabaab mined these routes in blatant violation of international laws and norms, particularly the Convention on the "prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines", which negatively affected the population in rebuilding their state [26].

AMISOM, as a combat-based mission, created a conducive environment for Somalia's stabilisation through the empowerment of its police and civilian components. These achievements strategically created a paradigm shift in AMISOM from being a combat force into a highly multi-dimensional mission to stabilise Somalia [27]. These findings also agree with Lotze and Williams's study on "the surge to stabilise, referring to lessons for the UN from the AU's experience in Somalia", concluding that AMISOM transformed combat initiatives into stabilisation initiatives [23].

Protection of Civilians (POC) Initiatives. Protection of civilians is a concept that constitutes actions established to enhance the security of a population and those at risk, with compliance and adherence to the rights of subjects recognised in regional and international instruments [6]. The AU Draft Guidelines for protecting civilians in the AU missions provided the legal basis that guided the AMISOM mandate towards state reconstruction [6]. The protection of civilians as a peace operation initiative in Somalia was essential to AMISOM's successes in state reconstruction. POC was in the middle of an AMISOM operation's mandate to ensure that a Somali State emerging from wars could create durable peace and stability [28]. As advanced by the Copenhagen school, protecting civilians was the first "securitising move" AMISOM pursued to foster reconstruction. Therefore, AMISOM recognised the significance of its initiative to protect civilians, given the inherent rights and physical safety of the civilian population, which could not be fully protected in an environment where conflicts or wars are perpetual or re-ignited.

The informants' views demonstrated that the AMISOM strategic framework aligned with AU and UN guidelines and complied with interna-

tional laws protecting civilians. Another informant, an international relations specialist and a Somalia National interviewed in Nairobi, further supported these views, stating that AMISOM had the power to employ any obligatory methods in prevention, deterrence, or response to threats of violence against the population. An informant further stated that effective POC implementation in AMISOM required a comprehensive and integrated framework to mitigate the multiple challenges missions faced within their mandate [6].

AMISOM engaged with parties to the conflict and affected Somali population, provided physical protection and established a protective environment; involved in dialogue and advocacy in support of reconciliation, peace agreements, liaising with the government and armed actors or the resolution of local conflicts; engaged in human rights investigations and reporting; took actions to provide physical protection, usually by deterring attacks on citizens through protective presence and regular patrolling. Effective patrols were informed by community liaison assistants (CLAs), early warning systems, public information, community alert networks and reporting systems. AMISOM peacekeepers also provided safe passages or refuges to assist the civilian population in escaping violence. When necessary, the mission employed all the required means, including deadly force, to protect the population physically [29].

AMISOM also contributed to establishing a protective environment where civilian populations were less prone to violence. AMISOM initiatives also strengthened the Somali administration's capacity to protect civilians through the rule of law, security reforms and an accommodative political process. AMISOM personnel participated in building the capacity of Somali National and Federal authorities to promote and respect human rights and improve the capacity of communities and civil society. Under the state-building theory, these approaches were essential in establishing the social foundations for sustainable peace and civilian protection guarantees [29].

Civil-Military Corporation (CIMIC) Initiatives. The primary goal behind civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) initiatives, whether a state or foreign actor, is to harness military capability to advance national security and defence interests [30]. In the context of AMISOM, a range of CIMIC activities were geared towards realising the state reconstruction in Somalia. In 2014, AMISOM dis-

tributed books and foodstuffs targeting orphans and needy children from poor backgrounds to boost their education standards as part of CIMIC initiatives. AMISOM troops under the leadership of Maj. Habil Nakhumwa and Captain Patrick Makundi of the Civil-military Cooperation (CIMIC) office also targeted Kafaalo primary and secondary schools in Farjano district, Kismayu town [31]. Somalia's top government official, Haadi, appreciated AMISOM for the immense support of peace-building processes in Kismayo and encouraged the troops to continue assisting the Somalis in dire need of education.

On October 12 2017, the Kenyan contingent to AMISOM, in collaboration with SNA, conducted CIMIC initiatives in Abdalla Biroole town, 40km southwest of Kismayo [25]. They offered free medical treatment to the local community and children, especially those affected by respiratory tract infections and other medical conditions [25]. These activities addressed the community medical requirements and fostered stronger community-military relations, thus aiding key mandates for improved security and state reconstruction.

On December 24 2021, in Kismayo, AMISOM, through CIMIC initiatives, supported educational and sports activities in Jubaland State [32]. AMISOM presented new classrooms, learning materials, sanitation amenities and sports-related equipment. Other equipment: laptops, office tables, desks, chairs, cabinets, stationery, blackboards, and games facilities for the school management of Abdalla Birole Primary [32]. These initiatives were done under the Quick Impact Projects as an extension of CIMIC initiatives to foster good relations with the population residing in the mission area [32].

Through CIMIC, AMISOM, in partnership with the Somali National Army (SNA), participated in community development initiatives such as roads and schools rehabilitation, drilling of boreholes and constructing safe water points, provision of medicine and medical services, and sports facilities. Most informants believed that, through implementing these CIMIC projects, AMISOM and its partners addressed the immediate and essential needs of Somali society and simultaneously built trust, confidence and belief in CIMIC-based initiatives. This approach was also embraced by the former AMISOM Deputy Force Commander (Operations and Plans), who called on the CIMIC officers under his command to work closely with

the communities liberated to develop confidence and a good relationship with the population. He advised the CIMIC officers to create harmony with locals in their jurisdictions and adhere to international laws to enhance trust between the civilians and the military components of AMISOM, thus leading to progress in attaining state reconstruction.

An informant interviewed online on June 29, 2024, in Nairobi, was enlightened that CIMIC initiatives under the AMISOM were vital in winning the hearts, souls, and minds of the Somali populace. He further pointed out that CIMIC aided the reconstruction agenda of AMISOM, where combat operations were impractical, such as addressing the flaws and divisions among the Somali clans. CIMIC also contributed to success in the security sector reforms, basic needs of the communities, and sharing of vital information and consequently changed the perceptions among the Somalis that AMISOM was a foreign aggressor with selfish intentions to a multi-dimensional intervention or gathering the needs and future of the Somali federal state. Like the above informant's views towards state reconstruction in Somalia, AMISOM CIMIC also helped the Jubaland Administration consolidate power in areas that insurgents initially controlled. Professionalised Jubaland Security forces regained main centres such as Bulagadud, Abdale Birolle and Kuday.

Most importantly, the security function provided a safe and secure environment within the district, making it easier for public servants to offer services closer to the citizens [33]; this assisted in building trust and confidence in the administration amongst the population to the disadvantage of Al-Shabaab, whose intent and operational strategies employed propaganda to distance and brainwash the locals to abhor AMISOM initiatives while rallying support for them. CIMIC operations in Somalia were a determining factor for successful peacekeeping missions and a tool for enhancing state reconstruction in Somalia [33].

The opinions of most informants also acknowledged that CIMIC filled the social and military gaps between the Somali civilian population, AMISOM and the Somali National Army, a prerequisite for attaining sustainable state reconstruction in Somalia. Since CIMIC is a vital tool during AMISOM initiatives on state reconstruction, it had underlying doctrinal deficiencies. AMISOM employed UN doctrinal approaches based on Western philosophy and traditions in

Somalia and its culture. Somalia as a state has strong components of Islamic fundamentalism and nationalism, which are not receptive to European approaches because they perceive it as an intrusion of Christianity in their way of life. As such, AMISOM, in its CIMIC structures, were not localised in the face of a real situation in a quasi-Islamic state. Therefore, the AMISOM-CIMIC framework and models did not consider the Somali stakeholders' input in the state reconstruction initiatives. Key informants, including Somali youth, women elders and scholars, were also of the universal view that the lack of comprehensive approaches in conducting CIMIC initiatives contributed to a situational circumstance where some critical players were conflict insensitive, complicating/frustrating the CIMIC outcomes.

Counter Terrorism Initiatives. Al-Shabaab's main agenda in Somalia has been to wage a nationalistic battle against the FGS [24]. Al-Shabaab openly claimed responsibility in many instances of bombings and suicide missions in Somalia, mainly targeting AMISOM and Somali authorities, as well as perceived allies [24]. Al-Shabaab has also been responsible for the execution of peace activists, aid workers and media personnel. In undermining the humanitarian initiatives, Al-Shabaab also blocked the delivery of humanitarian assistance from some European relief bodies during the famines, which caused deaths to thousands of the Somali population in 2011 [24]. Consequently, Al Shabab's actions have continued to haunt state reconstruction efforts.

The motivation behind AMISOM intervention in Somalia was to counter terrorism by reducing the threats posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed extremist groups [34]. As advanced by French scholar Professor Thierry, terrorism remains an existential threat to the state reconstruction process in Somalia. Therefore, AMISOM, aligning with securitisation theory, prioritised counter-terrorism in its security discourse, even though other uncertain events were more likely to harm people than terrorism.

As a principal actor in countering terrorism in Somalia, AMISOM was credited for removing Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and its vicinity following intensive urban warfare between 2011 and 2012. To sustain the counter-insurgency initiatives, AMISOM extended its operations beyond Mogadishu following the enjoinment of contingents from Kenya and Djibouti in 2012; this enabled AMISOM to push many of Al-Shabaab ele-

ments out of the significant population in Somalia's southern and central zones. AMISOM also dislodged militants and reclaimed several strategic bridge towns south of Mogadishu in 2019 and 2020 [13]; this relieved the Somali population from the cruelty and brutality of the Al Shabab administration in Somalia and subsequently created a good opportunity for more local authorities to emerge [31].

AMISOM's gains were also noticeable when Al-Shabaab suffered a blow between 2011 and 2012 following an increased number of defections by its fighters on complaints that Al-Shabaab attacks and suicide missions were not in line with Islamic doctrines and interpretation of Jihad as well as their contradictory views to the application of extortionists and negative attitudes toward humanitarian assistance from some relief agencies. These defections were viewed as a strategic gain towards AMISOM counter-insurgency initiatives because most defectors provided adequate and reliable intelligence about Al-Shabaab operations to AMISOM troops [32].

Gender-Based Initiatives. Gender-based initiatives are considered integral in state reconstruction [35]. Religious and cultural norms in Muslim states have specifically excluded women from peace processes, favouring a patrilineal path of social existence [36]. Somalia is ranked 4th last on the "UNDP Gender Inequality Index with a score of 0.776 (where the maximum score of 1 denotes complete inequality). Successful state reconstruction in the contemporary system lies in the involvement of women in the process [37]. The participation of women is central to success across the spectrum of attaining statehood [38]. The involvement of women falls under four fundamental pillars: participation of women in peace initiatives, prevention of girls and women from enduring all forms of violence, protecting women and vulnerable groups, and assistance in relief and recovery priority initiatives [39]. Further, a 2023 UN report asserts that "women are increasingly at-risk in conflict and underrepresented in peace processes". In fostering Gender-Based Initiatives, authors [39] allude that AMISOM had mixed results in advancing women's agenda in Somalia.

In compliance with UNSCR 1325 (2000), AMISOM developed a Gender Strategic Framework in 2013, covering five years. This strategic framework aimed to promote gender mainstreaming within the mission and in the external

context of Somali society [40]. In implementing this strategic plan within the mission area, AMISOM ensured that women's participation was high, ranging from a vast number of females deployed either as civilian components or as military and their branches or individual and formed police units in Somalia [41]. Statistically, there was a rise in the military component from the initial ten women deployed in 2007 to 850 women by 2018. This number of women in military contingents implied that four women were deployed for a hundred soldiers; thus, 4 % of all troops were women in March 2018 [7]. Although AMISOM didn't achieve the desired male-female ratio of 10% for the female forces as required by the UN Peacekeeping operations, there was a tremendous increase in the number of women deployed in AMISOM. AMISOM had 15 female personnel in the civilian components out of 72 officers. The deployment of the first gender officers to Mogadishu in 2012 and their civilian component as of 2018 increased to two within the cluster in charge of protecting and upholding human rights and gender issues. AMISOM completed training its new gender focal points to work across the mission's sectors in 2014 [7].

Women's involvement was confined to the areas of operations and outside the mission areas. Outside the mission, despite limited capacities, AMISOM assisted women's involvement in official political, peace and security initiatives in a community where women's rights are restricted. These initiatives constituted the development of a national gender policy and championed the 30% quota for women representatives in legislatures. AMISOM Police component also supported the involvement of women by demanding that at least 30% of the personnel it trains must include females gender [7]. AMISOM Police component actively supported specific provisions to promote gender protection by conducting training and standards, and creating gender desks in police stations specifically meant to address gender matters.

Security Initiatives. Towards sustainable state reconstruction in Somalia, through the lens of securitisation theory, AMISOM prioritised security as an essential factor in ensuring that stability is attained in the fragile and collapsed state. On security aspects, AMISOM was mandated under Resolution 2372 (2017) to help the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilisation, reconciliation and peace-building in Somalia and enable the

gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia as security strategic objectives.

AMISOM's arrival in Somalia in early 2007, its immediate mandate was to address the prevailing security situation and create a favourable environment for the political process to overcome the decades of conflict in Somalia [5]. AMISOM secured the regime change between the ICU and the installed TFG, implemented a national security plan and trained the TFG security personnel. From a security point of view, AMISOM supported the FGS in its war against Al-Shabaab [5]. In addressing maritime security, AMISOM and other international actors have worked jointly to prevent piracy and other high-seas crimes under international law [6]. The Federal Member States and FGS maritime components developed comprehensive strategic policy frameworks, capacity building, and enhancement initiatives to attain a better Somali state blue economy. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), EUCAP Somalia, and other actors undertook these initiatives.

In 2011, AMISOM's Police Component (drawn from Uganda and Nigeria) deployed Formed Police Units (FPUs) to Mogadishu, constituting 280 police personnel. FPUs were deployed to help the SPF secure urban centres under the FGS' control [10]. FPUs were involved in maintaining law and order in Mogadishu and played an essential role in supporting the SPF's 24-hour patrols and stop-and-search operations, significantly improving the security situation in the capital. Consequently, AMISOM FPU's presence with Somali police enabled local businesses to thrive at night, which indicates a growing state economy. Benson Oyo-Nyeko, former acting Police Commissioner in AMISOM in Mogadishu, acknowledged that Mogadishu witnessed improved security since the FPU and SPF began joint operations.

After 2012, AMISOM's expanded security operations enabled tremendous progress in securing major road networks entering and exiting Mogadishu. Insurgencies initially controlled the roads. Clearance of insurgence presence on these major roads proved that the security initiatives provided a conducive space for political dialogues and national reconciliation among Somali political elites. It also assured the political elites of security if they travelled for dialogue in the city. Regret-

tably, instead of seizing the opportunity, Somalia's national and regional leadership failed to utilise these opportunities and wasted a lot of time and resources.

By providing military escort and transportation for participants at numerous conferences, AMISOM contributed to the establishment of Southern and Central Somalia's interim regional administrations, namely Jubbaland, South West, Galmudug and Hiraaan and Middle Shabelle in 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively. However, the slow phase of the regional administrations' establishment undermined the progress of forging a political consensus in addressing essential issues relating to the federal constitution and national security architecture, which were vital for AMISOM to achieve its goal and secure its smooth exit strategy.

AMISOM established a concrete security foundation that enabled international and domestic actors such as the diplomatic community, international aid agencies, INGOs, and Somali government officials to operate freely in and outside Mogadishu as they perform their duties; this also helped humanitarian agencies to operate out of Somalia's capital and in particular south-central Somalia in delivering aid and relief food. The resurgence of new embassies, such as the United States embassy, would not have occurred without the security initiatives of AMISOM. In the same context, AMISOM provided security to hundreds of visits by various dignitaries, which impacted greater global attention to Somalia's reconstruction process in several international forums and media.

Humanitarian Initiatives. In compliance with humanitarian principles, AMISOM facilitated and aided humanitarian actors in Somalia in executing their mandate. AMISOM humanitarian initiatives in Somalia were critical phases of state reconstruction. However, the AMISOM humanitarian mandate was limited in scope to facilitation [42]. According to the mandate's stipulated scope, AMISOM was to; "facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)."

AMISOM also liaised and coordinated with humanitarian partners to facilitate access and delivery of humanitarian assistance to the vulnerable Somali population. It coordinated flights to deliver 29.61 metric tons of food aid on behalf of

the Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Ministry-Somalia (MOHADM) to Qansax Dheere. It also delivered food aid and water to households in the Gedo region (Ceel Waq and Garile). The AMISOM civilian component supported these initiatives by assisting the Somali vulnerable population and delivering critical public service (AUPC Report 995TH meeting May 11 2021, PSC/PR/2. (CMXCV). In describing the scope of AMISOM in the humanitarian agenda, most respondents emphasised the indirect role of the mission towards creating stability and a conducive environment within which humanitarian actors were free and able to execute the humanitarian mandate. Ideally, other non-combat initiatives in the AMISOM indirectly contributed to humanitarian development.

In executing its humanitarian role, AMISOM 2007 secured the required humanitarian corridors, particularly the seaports, airports and major streets in the port city of Mogadishu, to enable access to the needy Somali population. AMISOM also provided military escorts for humanitarian convoys headed to distribution centres in Somalia [42]. Through AMISOM Humanitarian Liaison Unit, AMISOM coordinated and cooperated with humanitarian agencies in Somalia. AMISOM partnered with UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA, WFP, and other UN-specialised agencies, as well as NGOs/civil society, to establish a unified model for data sharing. To enhance the humanitarian agenda, AMISOM partnered with the state ministries responsible for resettlement, health, humanitarian affairs, and other relevant agencies in Somalia [42].

The medical personnel of AMISOM provided medical care services to the citizens of Somalia caught in the conflict areas to promote medical health; this was possible by extending the medical facilities meant for the deployed personnel under the mission to the locals as part of the CIMIC strategy. Cognizant of Somalia's health and humanitarian situation, AMISOM Medical facilities became key medical points that the civilian population around Mogadishu relied on. According to AMISOM reports, three hospital departments treated more than 12000 patients on average monthly. Their medical requirements ranged from chronic conditions to surgical operations, both acute and complicated cases. Most of these incidents were from the local Somali population, including TFG officials and forces and those in need of emergency surgical interventions [42].

AMISOM medical staff also offered corrective surgery to patients with palate deformities as well as cleft lip, and attracted no charges [39]. AMISOM troops also provided adequate humanitarian assistance to the Somali population by providing water, food, blood, and medical supplies to local health institutions. AMISOM also participated in multiple initiatives to build harmonious relations with local communities; these included the construction of waterpoints and boreholes, school refurbishment, bridges, and road construction; this was done excellently by AMISOM contingent from Djibouti because of their linguistic and cultural identity that has huge resemblance with local Somali society [39].

An informant from Kenya Police Service who served as an Independent Police Officer in the AU Observer Mission in 2016/2017 in Somalia was interviewed on June 9, 2024, in Nairobi that: AMISOM, in its bid to foster state reconstruction in Somalia, despite limited scope, by greater extent, was involved in series of humanitarian initiatives which entailed free medical care to more than 12,000 people on monthly basis, provision of drinking water estimated 60,000 litres every day to Somalis residing near AMISOM bases. Consequently, these humanitarian programs enhanced the welfare and health of Somali people, a critical component of state building.

Institutional Capacity Building Initiatives. In line with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) No. 17 on the Revitalisation of Global Partnerships to attain sustainable development, capacity-building initiatives by AMISOM were vital in the reconstruction of Somalia. AMISOM's police components, in cooperation with those of UNSOM, implemented the federal policing model outlined in the National Security Architecture – formally adopted in June 2018 – to support the development of an efficient and effective Somali Police Force. AMISOM supported Somalia's regional and national police structures through screening, vetting, recruiting, training, and mentoring programs. This support included specialised investigations, anti-terrorism, and counter-insurgency training, significantly improving the Somali police force's capabilities.

In 2012, AMISOM was credited with capacity-building the Somali police force in many disciplines [39]. For example, in collaboration with the UN and the regional administrations of Puntland and Galmudug, AMISOM's police component trained one hundred Somali police officers for

joint patrols to help implement the Galkayo Ceasefire Agreement. Jubaland and South West Regional Administrations also benefited from AMISOM's training of 600 police personnel. More importantly, the mission supported Hirsh Belle in recruiting and training 800 strong police personnel in Jowhar and Beletweyne regions. In supporting the initiatives towards sustainable governance in Somalia, the police component of AMISOM also provided training for police officers in the Southwest State and Jubaland in 2017 to enhance the capacity-building base in training elected officials within the regions [39].

In developing institutional capacities with community policing, the AMISOM police component undertook biometric registration of the SNP personnel to identify the number of personnel, their bio-data, their skills, their respective areas and their deployment areas. Training on using biometrics was provided and later launched in their administrative centres [25]. AMISOM supported the retraining of SPF to ensure they acquire the necessary expertise, skills, capabilities and attitudes that meet policing requirements for a stable Somali state. AMISOM also developed Standard Operating Procedures and Guidelines for the various aspects of police roles. AMISOM also supported the re-activation of Somalia's National Bureau of INTERPOL, which was aimed at helping Somalia's combat against organised crime [39]. Developing Somali police infrastructure through building new police stations, refurbishing existing ones, and providing equipment and furniture was a key component of AMISOM contributions [42].

On January 18 2012, in Brigadier General Kahiye Police Academy, Mogadishu, the AMISOM Police Component launched capacity building and training on leadership, which contributed to the training of 97 Somali Police Force (SPF) junior police commanders (AMISOM, 2012). The trainers aimed to equip personnel selected from various police posts with the skills and knowledge needed to carry out their duties in the liberated areas. During the training, Dr Benjamin, AMISOM Police Training Coordinator, emphasised the importance of the exercise launched upon consultation between the Somali Police Force and the AMISOM Police component.

In 2013, the AMISOM Civilian Unit delivered theoretical training and on-the-job mentoring of Somali Civil Servants. AMISOM Political Unit facilitated a course for Somali Civil Servants in Bu-

jumbura, Burundi, bringing together 120 protocol officers, secretaries and administrators from various ministries of the Somali Government to support the Federal Government's policy of reconstruction of state institutions [11]. The AMISOM's Political Unit initiatives not only delivered key improvements in the lives of the Somali people but also towards creating a conducive environment for the political reconstruction of Somalia.

In April 2013, 197 Somali Police personnel (182 men and 15 women) graduated in specialised Public Order Management training in Djibouti, facilitated by the AMISOM Police Component and were deployed in local police stations to transform the force into a credible and effective institution [31]. AMISOM Training and Development Department also completed a comprehensive Training Needs Assessment (TNA) report, which assessed the plight of the police force in Somalia in developing an extensive training curriculum [31]. It was involved in developing short- and medium-term plans and programs for training and retraining, as well as training in building partnerships with local and international organisations interested in rebuilding the capacity of the Somali Police Force. In 2013, AMISOM and international partners trained over 1000 Somali Police personnel, making the year successful in AMISOM's history in the Somali Police Force capacity-building initiatives.

In a bid to build the capacity of the Somali security institutions, an informant (an independent police officer to AMISOM 2016-2017 in Mogadishu) further informed that the AMISOM Police Training Unit delivered more training programs on child and women rights, community policing, gender and sexual based violence, protection in conflict and post-conflict environments and training of trainers which positively impacted Somali capacity building strategy.

To help Somalia's decision-making processes, AMISOM planned and facilitated overseas benchmarking initiatives for the Somali political leadership, security personnel and civil society sectors. For instance, nine senior members of the Somali police force visited Nigeria to acquire primary information on their model of policing to help them determine the type of federal policing model which Somalia should adopt for effective command and administration. Co-location of AMISOM police and SPF in several jurisdictions and IPOs was assigned to support the local police

stations through enhanced mentorship and monitoring due to proximity. This framework facilitated election management during the 2012 and 2016-2017 Somali presidential and parliamentary elections, and it helped their colleagues provide security during Ramadan in 2017 and 2018.

CONCLUSIONS

The study concluded that AMISOM, despite the difficult circumstances of the peace support operations in Somalia, immensely contributed towards state reconstruction in Somalia. The numerous initiatives AMISOM employed substantially impacted the strides towards statehood in Somalia positively. The administrative, operational and military capacities of peace support operations on state reconstruction need to be reconciled with the stipulated mandate by the Security Council to ensure that it sufficiently attains its intended goals as it conforms with timelines, international laws and norms. The study also concluded that the authorisation agencies of PSOs should holistically build a nexus among all the stipulated state reconstruction initiatives to

enhance the overall outcome of the missions' mandates.

The study recommends that Peace Support Operations (PSOs) prioritise state reconstruction initiatives in their mandates because state reconstruction covers vast, varied, complex and relevant scopes that enable missions to achieve significant strides in line with the mission's stipulated objectives. United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in partnership with the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), in the context of African PSOs, should develop sustainable resolutions corresponding to the objectives, ensuring state reconstruction is fully attained. The study also recommends that policymakers develop post-conflict reconstruction plans. Foreign interventions should also be in tandem with the desires and aspirations of states and the people they intervene with so that legitimacy and realisation of statehood calls are attained with acceptance and with less or no friction. The study also reinforces the need for civic-military partnership or coordination as a strategic framework to achieve state reconstruction in war-torn, fragile and collapsed states.

REFERENCES

1. Talentino, A. K. (2005). *Military intervention after the Cold War: The evolution of theory and practice*. Ohio University Press.
2. Agbese, P. O., & Kieh, G. K. (2007). Reconstituting the state in Africa. In *Palgrave Macmillan US eBooks*. doi: 10.1057/9780230606944
3. Bellamy, A. J. (2008). The Responsibility to Protect and the problem of military intervention. *International Affairs*, 84(4), 615–639. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00729.x
4. UNDP. (2023). 2023 Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI). Breaking down gender biases: Shifting social norms towards gender equality. Retrieved from <https://hdr.undp.org/content/2023-gender-social-norms-index-gsni#/indicies/GSNI>
5. AMISOM. (2007). Mandate: 2006–2007. Retrieved from <https://amisom-au.org/mandate-2006-2007/>
6. African Union. (2012). *The second AMISOM Formed Police Unit arrives in Mogadishu*. Retrieved from <https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-second-amisom-formed-police-unit-arrives-in-mogadishu>
8. United Nations Security Council. (2014). *Resolution 2182(2014)*. Retrieved from [https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2182%20\(2014\)](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2182%20(2014))
7. Williams, P. D., D'Alessandro, M., Darkwa, L., Helal, A., Machakaire, J., & Rupesinghe, N. (2018). *Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)*. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).
9. Lotze, W., & Williams, P. D. (2016). *The Surge to Stabilise: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*. New York: International Peace Institute.

10. Odhiambo, E. O. S., Kassilly, J., Maito, L. T., Onkware, K., & Oboka, W. A. (2013). *War Termination In Somalia And Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) Role*. *Journal of Defense Resources Management*, 4(1), 57-68.
11. Bryman, A. (2016). *Social research methods*. Oxford University Press.
12. Harrison, H., Birks, M., Franklin, R., & Mills, J. (2017). *Case study research: Foundations and methodological orientations*. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 18(1).
13. Tchie, A. E. Y. (2022). *Waging Peace towards an African Union Stabilisation Strategy for Somalia*. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*.
14. Williams, P. D. (2013). Fighting for peace in Somalia: AMISOM's seven strategic challenges. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 17(3-4), 222-247. doi: 10.1163/18754112-1704004
15. Neuman, W. L. (2009). *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative approaches* (7th ed.). Pearson.
16. Reno, W. (2011). *Warfare in Independent Africa*. Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/cbo9780511993428
17. Guest, G., Bunce, A., & Johnson, L. (2005). How many interviews are enough? *Field Methods*, 18(1), 59-82. doi: 10.1177/1525822x05279903
18. Morse, J. M., & Niehaus, L. (2009). *Mixed method design: Principles and procedures*. Routledge.
19. Okeke, J. (2019). *Repositioning the AU's role in counter-terrorism operations*. *Institute for Security Studies*
20. Creswell, J. W. (2007). *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*. Sage Publications.
21. Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). *Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook* (2nd ed.). Sage Publications.
22. Kibuko, F. (2014). *Potentials and pitfalls of civilian component in African peace support operations - a case study of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)*. *Peace Palace Library Digital Collections*
23. Lotze, W., & Kasumba, Y. (2012). *AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians in Somalia*. *Conflict Trends*, 17-24
24. US Department of State. (2008). United States Actions on Somalia Piracy. Retrieved from <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/io/rls/fs/113321.htm>
25. Kamais, C. E., Okoth, P. G., & Kimokoti, S. N. (2024). African Union Mission in Somalia considerations for transition and Kenya's national security. *African Journal of Empirical Research*, 5(2), 267-280. doi: 10.51867/ajernet.5.2.24
26. Williams, P. D. (2018). *Fighting for peace in Somalia: A history and analysis of the African Union Mission, 2007-2017*. Oxford University Press.
27. Amadi, A. I. (2014). *An Analysis of Peacekeeping Strategies in Africa: The Case of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)* (Thesis; University of Nairobi).
28. Abdulhamid, A. (2021). *Protecting Civilians in Armed Conflict: The Case of the African Union Mission in Somalia* (Thesis; Dalhousie University Halifax).
29. Gurhan, M. M. (2020). *Emergence and role of AMISOM peacekeeping mission in Somalia; 2011-2016*. (Thesis; Kenyatta University)
30. Kasselmann, H. J. (2012). Civil-Military Cooperation: A Way to Resolve Complex Crisis Situations. *PRISM*, 4(1), 17-29.

31. AMISOM. (2021). AMISOM and partners meet to strategise on effective civil-military relations. Retrieved from <https://amisom-au.org/2015/05/amisom-and-partners-meet-to-strategize-on-effective-civil-military-relations/>
32. AMISOM. (2021). AMISOM boosts education and sports for communities in Jubaland State. Retrieved from <https://amisom-au.org/2021/12/amisom-boosts-education-and-sports-for-communities-in-jubaland-state/>
33. Muchemi, M. K., & Ichani, X. F. (2021). Civil-Military Cooperation of African Mission in Somalia as Tool of Peace-building in Kismayo District, Lower Jubbaland, Somalia (2011-2020). *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science*, 5(11).
34. United Nations Security Council. (2017). Resolution 2182(2017). Retrieved from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1317395?ln=ru#files>
35. Ilesanmi, O. A. (2021). UNSCR 1325 and African Women in Conflict and Peace. In *Springer eBooks*, 813–832. doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-28099-4_94
36. Gutiérrez-Martínez, I., Saifuddin, S. M., & Haq, R. (2021). The United Nations Gender Inequality Index. In *Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks*. doi: 10.4337/9781788975728.00013
37. Carey, H. F. (2020). *Peace-building Paradigms: The Impact of Theoretical Diversity on Implementing Sustainable Peace*. Cambridge University Press.
38. Rai, S. M., & Lievesley, G. (1996). *Women And The State: International Perspectives (Gender, Change & Society, 2)*. Taylor & Francis.
39. Williams, P. D. (2018). Subduing Al-Shabaab: The Somalia model of counter-terrorism and its limits. *The Washington Quarterly*, 41(2), 95–111. doi: 10.1080/0163660x.2018.1484227
40. George, N., & Shepherd, L. J. (2016). Women, Peace and Security: Exploring the implementation and integration of UNSCR 1325. *International Political Science Review*, 37(3), 297–306. doi: 10.1177/0192512116636659
41. Kang'ung'u, F. K. & Ichani, X. F. (2023). Gender Mainstreaming Policies and Women Participation in Peace Support Operations: A Case of Kenya's Contingents in African Mission in Somalia, 2011-2020. *Journal of African Interdisciplinary Studies*, 7(3), 34 – 60.
42. AMISOM. (2017). *AMISOM convenes humanitarian facilitation training for civilian partners in Somalia's HirShabelle state*. Retrieved from <https://amisom-au.org/2018/04/amisom-convenes-humanitarian-facilitation-training-for-civilian-partners-in-somalias-hirshabelle-state/>