

The Limitations of Commercialized Security on National Security in Nairobi County, Kenya

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DOI: 10.22178/pos.78-3

JEL Classification: K40

Received 22.12.2021

Accepted 27.01.2022

Published online 31.01.2022

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Abstract. The state has traditionally undertaken maintenance of security and good order for the citizens. But due to the deficiencies in governments, other actors have been looked upon to supplement the supply of security services. The commercial security industry, which has developed and grown expansively, is one. The sector provides policing services to their subscribed consumers. Despite the commercialised security industry growing in Nairobi, Kenya, few studies have assessed the limitations of commercialised security to impact national security on national security positively. The study took on a cross-sectional survey design. A multistage sampling technique was employed to obtain the respondents. Questionnaires, scheduled interviews and structured observation were used to collect data. These descriptive statistics were used to summarise variables into thematic areas and convey key variables' characteristics. The study identified six limitations: not being armed with firearms was the most mentioned, poor working conditions of guards was second mentioned, lack of courtesy by guards was the third most mentioned, lack of trust by the state security agencies was the fourth, and last was, lack of regulation and licensing. The study concluded that the limitations of commercialised security on national security bring the hurdles the industry faces to the fore.

Consequently, the country should have favourable mechanisms to oversee the industry's continuous reevaluation. The suitable means can only be realised through the stakeholders' consultation: the commercial security industry, the citizens and the state. Thus, the study recommended that the Private Security Regulation Authority start implementing some of the requirements in the PSRA No. 13 of 2016.

It meant to streamline the industry in terms of the training of the security guards, remunerations of the security guards, minimum requirements for recruitment and working environments.

Keywords: commercial security; commercial security services; manned guarding; alarms and electronics; CVIT; investigation; security; limitations; national security.

INTRODUCTION

People have a natural inclination for self-protection and self-preservation, making them enter into a contract with a higher authority to achieve it. The sovereign was to be obeyed by all, and it had the moral obligations to protect and preserve people's lives and property [22]. Hence, the modern norm of national security dates back as far as the seventeenth century when Hobbes introduced the social contract. This was based on his theory of social contract where the citizens gave up their natural right to use force and, in return, to be protected by the state [18]. The intention of this agreement was to outlaw violence among people and contained chaotic conflict.

This aspect of granting the state the monopoly to exercise violence within its borders and enforce the objectives of protecting and preserving people's lives and property is described as national security. This was influenced by the views of Max Weber with his 'Weberian State' that enjoyed the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence [30]. Accordingly, the state is assumed to be responsible for providing security for its subjects.

The different security needs by the citizen's places many demands beyond the state's capability, making it challenging for equal distribution of security service [4]. Therefore, a range of actors is explicitly looked upon to supplement the sup-

ply of security services [38]. Perhaps the most important actors in the commercial security industry (CSI) have grown expansively in both developed and developing countries. Some studies have correlated the growth and expansion of commercialised security markets with deficiencies in the ability of nations to deliver security-related services [1; 5] effectively. Commercial Security comprises enterprises that provide some aspect of security/policing services with a profit motive [34]. Commercial security is described as fee-paying services to protect persons and physical assets [4; 38].

Commercial security firms represent trade and industry players according to the market laws, but they are also representatives of players in the security industry. Due to their bestowed use of force, this industry can increase or decrease citizens' security. Therefore, their activity faces challenges to freely operate on the market while simultaneously observing human rights standards [20]. Some critics of the commercial security industry have even maintained that it cannot be legitimate because it consists of illegitimate actors [20]. They advocate placing a ban on the entire commercial security industry and re-nationalisation of the security and military competencies of the state.

Recent studies conducted in Nairobi on commercialised security have consistently focused on the development and growth of commercialised security, but with restrained reflection on how commercial is limited to impact positively feed into national security. A study was conducted on the factors affecting the performance of commercial security firms in Nairobi County [15]. The study showed that security conditions in the country would significantly improve with a well-regulated CSI and appeared to allude to the importance of a well-regulated industry. Still, it falls short in providing a holistic explanation of how commercialised security is limited to positively impacting national security.

Another study that examined commercialised security services and crime control in Nairobi County pointed out that citizens opt for commercial security firms (CSFs) for their security needs [17]. The CSFs are seen to tailor their service to each customer, unlike the public security agencies who collectively serve the community. The extent to which these tailored security services impact national security is left unaddressed in the study. In addition, the study revealed that the

government needs to regulate the CSI roles as security providers to achieve oversight and control over them. This could imply that some of the services offered by CSI may not be aligned with national security, thereby creating a need to study the limitations of commercialised security impact on national security.

Further, another study was conducted on how the availability of commercial security services assists in crime control in Nairobi County [21]. The study identified five categories of crime control services: alarm response, mobile patrols, residential security, security surveillance in marked security vehicles at strategic points, and regulating public access control to buildings. Despite these security services, insecurity is still experienced in Nairobi; consequently, the need to understand what limits the CSI from eliminating insecurity.

Literature Review

Scholars have described the routines and challenges related to manned guarding [4; 25]. From their findings, the security guards were found to have complemented the activities of the public security agents in security management. Although, the challenges confronting them have drastically reduced their capacities to effectively provide essential services for the security needs of their customers. However, the authors do not state the obstacles facing the security guards. The current study sought to discover the various challenges and limitations confronting the security guards and how they impact national security.

Similarly, other scholars have sought to reveal the competence and limitation of manned guards, mainly through the eyes of security managers and users of security services, by studying a total of 471 respondents [8]. The study analysed differences between the competencies self-assessed by manned guards, the competencies assessed by their managers, and the users of their services. The study failed to reveal the competencies and limitations of the manned guards in security provision. Instead, the findings suggested that the users of security services would better evaluate manned guards' interpersonal competencies. But it did not state the competencies and limitations confronting the security guards [8]. However, this study proposed to explore the competencies and limitations of

manned guards in security provision on national security.

Accordingly, while much commercial security personnel perform some roles similar to those performed by the state security agents, they mostly do not have more power than average citizens [28; 29]. Principally, the security guards act on behalf of the person, organisation, or another entity that hires them. That entity's fundamental right to protect persons and assets is transferred to the security guard. Unless deputised, commissioned or provided for by ordinance or statute of a particular country, commercial security guards have no more extraordinary powers in law than any citizen [29]. Therefore, the following legal controls should be exercised with caution by the commercial security guards when performing their duties: arrest and detention, interrogation, search and seizure, and use of force.

For that reason, for example, some of the manned guards do not have law enforcement experience and may not be fully aware of law enforcement's capabilities and resources [38]. Such a challenge in Nigeria attracted public criticisms of the activities of many manned guards, to the extent that some stakeholders were calling for the banning of commercial security firms [12]. It was also found that mistrust and disrespect exist between the public policy and commercial security industry. The former believes that the latter is ineffective in reducing crime and only profits [23]. Similarly, it has been asserted that the state security agencies have difficulties with the commercial security personnel. They (police) feel that they are more professional because they represent the state [36].

In retort, it has been argued that when guards have little knowledge of standard operation procedures, the quality of delivered service is ultimately low [4]. In some notable cases, the manned guards have robbed the individuals they are entrusted to protect. Such a scenario points to the belief that instead of commercial security being a solution for the nation's security, they aggravate insecurity. However, the current study explored the effect of criminal activities of the members of commercial security and their lack of law enforcement experience on national security.

It has been reported on the involvement in armed robberies by members of commercial security on CVIT services [37]. This limitation negates the very security provision this economic sector provides to the nation. The study then

recommended enhanced surveillance by the banks and CVIT firms on their services as deterrence to criminals. Collaborations on the same have reported incidents involving the criminal behaviour of CVIT security guards [16]. A robbery worth N\$1.8 million from the First National Bank of Namibia on April 28 2014, is also reported [16]. The theft was staged by the CVIT crew tasked with servicing ATMs. These two studies examined the involvement in the criminal behaviour of commercial security on CVIT service. Still, this research aims at finding out the association of the criminal behaviour of CVIT crew on national security.

A study surveyed 127 employees of CVIT firms using open and closed-ended questionnaires regarding their victimisation experiences [41]. These were to provide plans for mitigations against armed robberies. Wetstein advised that, as there is a lack of literature on the CVIT crew victimisation, future research within the industry will need to assess the limitations of various variables on CVIT and make policies for CVIT. Another rejoins by noting that the cash and valuable transit crew are vulnerable to victimisation compared to the other standard security services [11]. However, this study proposed to explore the impact of vulnerability to the victimisation of CVIT crews on national security.

Some of the critical features in the management of the commercial security industry are its regulation and licensing. The rule of the commercial security industry is necessitated because its services are very crucial, sensitive and costly, and there is a need to protect consumers by assuring that they receive the quality of services that they are paying for [7]. Commercial security personnel come into regular contact with the public as power holders, and therefore, such connection must be regulated for safety reasons [7]. Hence, there is a lack of homogeneity in the states where the USA's legislation and regulations are present [9]. For example, terminologies are not uniform. There is a lack of unanimity on the degree to which the states should regulate and standardise education, training, and licensing in the commercial security industry [9]. Regulations are mainly concentrated on the character requirements for directors and workforce, with some states having the least operating standards.

A study on the current state of South Korea's private investigation industry and its legislation process reports that commercial investigation

service has been growing due to the increase of people's living standards and the awareness of their human rights [6]. However, the commercial investigation industry has not been legalised [6]. This results in commercial investigators engaging in illegal activity that disrupts society, and to conclude this problem, regularisation of commercial security investigation is needed in the community [6]. While discussing commercial investigation as "a necessary but dangerous class" in Australia, it was concluded that the practitioners are limited by legal uncertainties [42]. Since the industry is currently not regulated and licensed, it has resulted in mistrust of the profession by the police, who perceive them as amateurs and engaging in criminal activities [42]. However, these studies did not find out the limitations of commercial security on national security due to lack of regularisation. This study discovered the rules of the unregulated commercial security industry on national security.

Failures to develop mechanisms to ensure effective oversight of commercial security has some consequences, including an inability to ensure that commercial security firms are not vulnerable to organised crime, unethical and/or illegal behaviour [24]. Similarly, light has been on the weaknesses in the regulation of the commercial security industry and the shifting security provision responsibilities [43].

A study proposed stricter screening and regulation, which would enhance competency and integrity for the customers as the commercial security would not be limited by uncertainties [32]. Whereas it has been proposed that the need for institutionalising commercial security through legislation so that institutionalisation uncertainties do not limit their operations, to our knowledge, studies on proponents of the institutionalisation of commercial security have not highlighted the limitations of regulation and licensing of the commercial security industry on national security [6; 32; 42; 43]. Therefore, this study sought to discover the limitations of a weak regulated commercial security industry on national security.

METHODOLOGY

A cross-sectional design was adopted for the study, as different respondents were studied simultaneously. It gives a more substantial likelihood for participation. It also helped gather objective information used for generalisation to a

larger population. The design also fits diverse experiences into predetermined response categories.

The research was carried out in Nairobi County, where the capital of Kenya sits, and most CPFs have their headquarters. Stratified sampling was used to cluster the target population into homogenous groups as:

1. Consumers of the commercialised security services: 1) Those who buy or manage commercial security services for their organisations. These are primarily security managers and officers, and 2) The general public.
2. The providers of commercialised security services: 1) Those are working as operations/heads of security; 2) Those who work as static security guards and mobile security guards.

The study used table [44] to arrive at the figure to be sampled. The study population fell under N 100,000, and therefore, the sample size was 400. The respondents were clustered as: consumers (n=200) and Providers (n=200).

The commercialised security services' consumer respondents were divided into 50 security managers/officers and 150 from the general public who have experienced commercial security services in functions or venues. Also, the providers of commercialised security services were divided as 50 as operations/heads of security and 150 working as static security guards and mobile security guards.

The research targeted 114 commercial security firms in Kenya. There are 76 listed security firms at the Protective Security Industry Association, and 38 listed security firms at the Kenya Security Industry Association, in Kenya [19; 33]. The researcher used multistage sampling to get the sample size and identify the respondents.

The study used structured questionnaires (completed by the guards of the CSFs, general public), one-on-one interviews with open-ended questionnaires (with the top management members from both CSFs and the consumer organisations/facilities), and structured observation (of procedures and daily workings of security guards). The researcher delivered the questionnaires at the security firm's offices and picked them up within three days. Follow-up calls were made to ensure success in filling in the questionnaires. Out of 400 questionnaires administered to the interviewees, 374 were declared valid as they did not have any errors.

The data collected was analysed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences software (SPSS version 25, 2017). The interpreted data were then summarised using percentages, ratios, frequencies and measures of central tendency. The shares and ratios were important for comparing similarities and disparities at different levels. Multiple regression was done where further statistical analysis was required. The ethical consideration was that the researcher informed all participants of their voluntary participation, confidentiality, and government agencies' relevant authorisation.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents analyses and interprets data related to the study. Studies have shown that the commercial security industry faces challenges to operate in the market freely and at the same time observe standards of human rights [20]. Some studies on the routines and challenges related to the commercialised security industry found out that, to some extent, they complemented the activities of the police, but the challenges confronting them in the course of their duties drastically reduce their capacity to provide essential services to their customers effectively. Therefore, it is crucial to find out the limitations of commercialised security to impact national security positively. The findings are presented in subsections discussing each regulation. Study respondents were asked to identify the constraints encountered by commercialised guarantees to impact their national security positively. The identified diverse limitations are shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1 – The Limitations of Commercialized Security to Impact Positively on National Security

Limitation	Frequency	%
Not Being Armed with Firearms	293	78.3
Poor Working Conditions of Security Personnel	254	67.9
Lack of Courtesy by Guards	137	36.6
Lack of Trust by the State Security Agencies	80	21.4
Lack of Regulation and Licensing	67	17.9
Security Personnel are not Adequately Trained	59	15.8

Not being armed with firearms was the most mentioned by 293 (78.3%) respondents. Poor working conditions of guards was second, being mentioned by 254 (67.9) respondents. Lack of courtesy by guards was the third most mentioned by 137 respondents, which is 36.6%. Lack of trust by the state security agencies was the fourth most mentioned by 80 respondents, which is 21.4%. Lastly, lack of regulation and licensing was cited by 67 respondents (17.9%).

Not being armed with firearms

293 (78.3%) respondents mentioned incidences of not being armed with firearms. Criminals have become smart and are using sophisticated methods of committing crimes. Some of the methods include the usage of firearms. An alarm backup crew commander stated, "We are not armed with firearms, but *we are expected to deal and intervene to stop criminals armed with guns. The cases of armed criminals are on the rise*".

An alarms backup response manager respondent confirmed: "*It is a dilemma we are currently facing as our crew are not armed with guns, but they are always responding to situations where the offenders have guns*".

A general manager of a consumer organisation reiterated: "*Because our guards are not armed with guns, we were once robbed. Together with our security guards, we all surrendered and laid down*".

A security officer challenges every single danger that presents itself. Therefore, security officers are marked by criminals who are out to steal, destroy, harm or otherwise conduct unlawful activities on a facility.

Security personnel not armed with firearms put their lives at risk every time they are on duty. Their lives are as important as the lives of those they are protecting, and therefore any dangers and harm they face limits their contribution to national security. The duty of the commercial security personnel to intervene when they witness unwanted or unlawful events on the facilities they are guarding places them in harm's way. For that reason, commercial security personnel confront most dangers that present themselves, including facing assailants armed with firearms. Therefore, unarmed security guards do not discourage attempts of armed criminals. Indeed, potential criminals and other types of vandals will

not be deterred to violate places where there are unarmed security guards. As the commercial security personnel continue to face assailants armed with firearms, it reduces their ability to contribute positively to national security.

The present arms law does not allow commercial security companies to hold and issue firearms to their security personnel. In Part VIII of the Equipment and other tools of the trade for private security services, Section 53, use of firearms, (1) "A private security service provider shall not use or allow the use of firearms in the rendering of a security service. (2) A person who contravenes the provisions of this section commits an offence and shall in addition to the cancellation of license, be liable on conviction to a penalty prescribed in this Act or any other written law, whichever is higher".

This law aims to eliminate the persistent and regular use of armed force by citizens or entities offering security services. This is meant to retain the status quo of the state monopoly on using armed force and seeking to outlaw violence among groups of peoples in national borders, thereby containing the organised conflict in the national arena. It was observed that not having firearms while encountering offenders armed with firearms was a challenge confronting the commercial security industry [2]. Similarly, it has been noted that the CVIT crew were the most vulnerable to victimisation by armed criminals [11].

Poor Working Conditions of Guards

254 (67.9%) respondents mentioned the poor working conditions of the guards. This refers to the unsatisfactory general management of the security personnel, including basic salary and allowances, working hours, job insecurity and the overall workplace environment. On the number of working hours, a security guard respondent pointed out that: *"We work for 12 hours, but as from the 9th hour, we are exhausted and fatigued. That is the time we are at our weakest; our passion is low, and the attention is very little"*.

A security firm manager respondent explained: *"The guards are supposed to work for 12 hours, and 4 of those hours is overtime. Their zeal might be below, but it is still working time because they will be paid"*.

The security guards work for more than 12 hours a day. That is because handing over, taking over, and daily briefings extend the standard 12 hours. These findings indicate that the security guards are overworked. The effects of overworked guards include a lack of passion for work and, slowing in their duties, ultimately declining their productivity. This is further explained by the self-determination theory, which is one of the theories under the Cognitive theory of motivation that states the innate needs of a person must be met to perform competently. They must also be made to make choices and promote self-regulation. Without the ability to choose between working for 12 hours a day, the security guards will lack the passion for fostering competence. Security guards lack power for work and are therefore not committed to repeatedly attaining better performance levels. These guards lack individual resilience and a leaning toward learning and advancing that would help their customer's security needs. Therefore, they are not able to withstand continuous security challenges and disruptions. The same is echoed by other studies that choices such as job retention are made to get the outcome of job security, and the result has to be attractive enough to prompt an individual to start working towards it [27].

The secret to consistent effective security outcomes is to have security guards who are consistently not overworked and who will then be passionate about their responsibilities. According to the Expectancy-Value theory, passion/motivation is governed by the value of a goal interpreted in terms of costs in pursuing the dream. It is with the idea that everyone needs achievement, but they have to be motivated to engage in that activity to the extent that the success will be more than the costs. If the price is too high, a person may avoid pursuing the goal. In this case, the security guards' efficiency and effectiveness in security duties performance are the goals, whereas working for longer hours is the cost. So many security firms make the mistake of incentivising overworked guards with quick bonuses or benefits, but they only get short period outcomes. Another study has reiterated that it translates to a worker's output, the reward. If the worker takes specific steps, he will achieve the outcome, resulting in the promised reward [27].

Overworked guards are much harder to uphold an approachable and appealing character while interacting with consumers. When guards are

overworked, they cannot strategise (applying different levels of effort to different situations) [34]. The security profession is dependent on interpersonal conversation, creating judgment decisions, studying people's expressions, and handling their dynamic responses. Customers often sense and react negatively to stressed and overworked guards. Researchers have found that overworking (and its accompanying stress and exhaustion) can make maintaining a friendly and engaging demeanour, strategising, making judgment calls, and managing their emotional reactions more difficult, hence compromising security provision for the people their property. A study on the effects of overworked employees also established that an overworked guard found it hard to maintain a friendly and appealing demeanour when interacting with customers and traded-off with decreased security management [34].

The maximum number of working hours to ensure the best output of a worker is 52 hours per week, according to the Employment Law Cap 226 of the Laws of Kenya. This Act stipulates that any additional hours should be treated as overtime. However, despite being treated as overtime, it has been found that 2-3 hours into the overtime, the security output of the guards is at its lowest, defeating the purpose of the overtime payment. Further, these findings confirm that security guards work for longer hours in Kenya.

On overtime allowances, a security guard respondent pointed out: *"We know that we are supposed to get overtime, but sometimes it is a challenge to get it. You do not get it on the pay-slip, so we have to make claims which sometimes are not paid"*.

A security firm manager respondent explained: *"The cases of missing overtime allowances on our security guard's pay-slips are there. We try as much as possible to pay them when the claims are made"*.

This study found ongoing violations of overtime allowance has condemned security personnel to be demotivated employees. Demotivated security personnel are weak in security provision as criminals compromise or get lax in their duties. This demotivation makes them the weak link in commercial security management.

According to Victor Vroom's Expectancy theory, there is a positive co-relationship between a desirable outcome like allowances and a worker's

effort in performing a job [40]. If the guards feel that they are not being rewarded according to their performance efforts, they will not function effectively, compromising security provisions. When security provision is compromised, people and their property will be exposed to danger, directly impacting national security.

There was also found a link between job insecurity and security job performance. A security guard had this to say: *"A majority of us are casuals, and whenever a contract with a customer end, our services are terminated. Therefore, this does not work where you can put your focus in"*.

An administrator in charge of security in a consumer organisation pointed out: *"We are supplied with casual guards because the firms say that our rates cannot afford permanently employed security guards. The casuals have many challenges as they rarely stay for more than a year"*.

A security firm manager corroborated this view: *"We have the casual security guards to cater for our customers who want to pay the minimum rates. The challenge with the casual security guards is the high turnover, which interferes with our customers' continuity of security services"*.

There is a concern over job insecurity, which is one of the factors that has led to poor working conditions for the commercial security personnel, thereby limiting security provision and delivery. Job insecurity does not provide security personnel with a much-needed sense of identity and association. This job insecurity leads to a decrease in work performance levels.

Security personnel who feel threatened by job insecurity stop putting the required effort into completing their security tasks and interacting with workmates because they believe they have no future with the organisation. Security personnel with a sense of job insecurity do not plan to work for the security firm for the foreseeable future, so they do not maintain relationships with colleagues and do not complete their work. Since security duties revolve around teamwork and tasks completion, this, in the long run, decreases the quality of security provision for the people and their properties. In retort, it has been found that improved job security boosted the guard's performance, which in turn ensures better protection for people and their property [26].

Lack of job security results in the high turnover of the security guards as they continuously seek jobs with better terms. The high turnover of the

security guards hurts security service provision. This is occasioned by the security gaps left after the exit of the experienced guards, the recruitment process of the new guards and the time it will take for the new guards to understand their responsibilities effectively. Bearpark and Schulz have been cited as having observed that, due to such exploitation, security guards are forced by circumstances to be involved in criminal activities [30]. This limitation negatively impacts national security, which contributes to failing national security.

Lack of Courtesy by Guards

As illustrated in table 1 above, lack of courtesy was reported by 137 (36.6%) respondents as a limitation of commercial security, impacting positively on national security. This criticism was levelled against the industry by both the consumers and providers. A general public respondent complained: *"I wonder whether some of the security firms train their guards on being polite when interacting with visitors. Being firm in their security duties should not translate to being rude"*.

A manager of a consumer organisation reiterated: *"We always induct the security guards assigned to us on good mannerism. We understand that their service delivery can be hampered if this is not instilled in them thoroughly"*.

A manager of a security firm provider concurred that: *"Lack of gentility and being considered rude is one of our greatest challenges. We try our level best to train them in it, but I think that it gets eroded when they interact with others in the field"*.

The responses show the relation between being courteous and successful delivery of security services. Security personnel confuse being firm and fair with being rude. Commercial security personnel are generally responsible for creating, implementing, and maintaining various controls over personal behaviour. They cannot succeed in their duties when handling people without being courteous. This communicates a lack of respect, which will hinder cooperation and thrash trust between the consumers and the providers. The human factor that has to do with the security personnel carrying out their duties is crucial in successfully securing people and property [10]. To this view, security services demand high ethical standards for successful implementation [4]. Accordingly, arguing from a consequential perspective of ethics, it is observed that courtesy is

concerned with human relationships and success in the work environment [10]. This implies that if there is a lack of civility in the working relationship, consumers may not readily cooperate with the commercial security personnel.

Notably, the enhanced authority of security personnel allows them to conduct searches, investigations, and document analysis, among others that delve into people's privacy [4]. This requires that the services are done with courtesy to protect the dignity of people. Failure to be courteous in how the security personnel carry out their work could indicate disrespect, hindering performance. In a nutshell, enhanced authority begets increased responsibility in maintaining human dignity as the personnel strive to serve the public.

This resonates with findings that lack of courtesy drastically reduces the commercial security personnel's capacity to effectively provide essential security services for their customers [25]. In essence, a lack of courtesy from security guards undermines their efforts to protect people and property effectively, thus negatively impacting national security.

Lack of Trust by the State Security Agencies

Lack of trust between the commercial security agents and the state security agents as a limitation was mentioned by 80 (21.4%) respondents. Without trust, information-sharing, which is the critical purpose of collaboration and cooperation, will not occur to any appreciable extent. As one security firm manager commented: *"There are occasions when we feel that the police are using our guards as scapegoats when undertaking investigations where our guards are deployed. This has left some bitter and sour feelings with some of us"*.

A security guard explained that: *"Mostly when an incident occurs where we are deployed, the police incriminate us instead of conducting a thorough investigation. That happens even when the evidence does not point to us. That strains our working relationship with them"*.

Another security guard pointed out that: *"The police see us as untrained and unprofessional from the way we interact with our customers"*.

The state security agents' mistrust of the security guards stems from the fact that the security guards are always the first suspects when a security incident occurs where the guards are de-

ployed. Because of the assumption that the security guards are the first suspects and how investigations are conducted, the security industry feels that the police are biased against them.

Therefore, the commercial security personnel feel a shoddy investigation by the police through errors, inaction, and the way evidence is collected, which sometimes is riddled with irregularities that allow suspects to get away, hence resorting to implicit them. Such actions have further created a lack of trust between the two institutions who are supposed to be partners in crime prevention, thereby undermining a collective effort to combat crime and insecurity.

The commercial security guards also perceive that the police view them as short-lived and poorly trained. Training for security officers is measured in days (typically 5–14), while training for police officers is measured in months (on average 9–10). The result of that training produces substantially different security cultures and mindsets. Each of these organisations' approaches interacts with their customers is noticeably different. As for the police and other law enforcement personnel get programmed and are expected not to continually engage with their customers, who are the citizens in their jurisdiction. At the same time, the commercial security industry encourages their personnel to be highly interactive with their customers not to risk losing their customers and contracts to other firms. In this regard, the law enforcement personnel agents get an impression that there is no professionalism, which the commercial security agents are bringing to the table.

When one or both of the two agencies supposed to protect people and property display an apparent show of mistrust due to perceived differences, the partnership of enhancing national security is compromised and weakened. Also, suspicion and disrespect exist between the police and commercial security personnel as the former believes that the latter is ineffective in fighting crime [23]. Similarly, the police have difficulties with the commercial security personnel because they feel more trained in safeguarding the citizens. For that reason, they should be the ones doing all the duties appertaining to securing the citizens and their properties [36].

Lack of Regulation and Licensing

Parameters and constraints are crucial to this industry due to the immense burden. 67 (17.9%)

respondents mentioned regulation and Licensing. One of the providers lamented: *"The regulatory authority was formed a year ago, but we have never been inspected for compliance"*.

When informed about the existence of the Private Security Regulation Authority and its mandate, a consumer respondent exclaimed: *"I am not aware of any security industry regulations or an authority that is supposed to be regulating the industry"*.

One security guard reacted when informed about the Act by the researcher: *"I am not aware of the requirement that we should be registered by any other body apart from our employer. I have not even heard it discussed amongst the guards"*.

The Private Security Regulation Authority was supposed to ensure regulation and licensing, but some consumers and providers are still unaware of its existence. Due to its unknown presence by the majority of the stakeholders in the industry, it is difficult for it to fulfil its mandate. The commercial security industry had been self-regulating through security associations until late 2016. After that, the PSRA, No13 of 2016 paved the way for forming an authority to oversee the practice of commercial security in Kenya by making it accountable and responsible. The dangers of an unregulated commercialised security industry are the infiltration of criminal gangs and the provision of substandard security services that would negatively impact national security.

The lack of regulation and licensing to ensure compliance is a significant hindrance to the operations of the CSI in providing the public and their properties safety. In the absence of effective regulation and licensing, CSFs, as expected, rank higher the desires of proprietors and investors above those of their customers and the general public, which is the maximisation of profits. They do not pass on some of their resources to progress their superior values in particular tasks, paramount in training. Therefore, some firms are not training all their security personnel through training schools or government-accredited training bodies. This is an addition to the salaries of the guard's that is not increasing to fulfil the country's minimum income policy. This, in turn, is the detriment of general public security. Commercial security personnel who are not well trained, not adequately equipped, and not motivated can work hand in hand with the state security agents to keep people and their property secured around the clock. Likewise, it has been

found that the commercial security industry can harm innocent members of society if unregulated and unstandardised [29].

Although legislations can be in place in the commercial security industry, a lack of adequate follow-up mechanisms to ensure compliance with the provisions of the legislation can be a drawback. Commercial security firms are not obligated to offer ethically guided professional services without a mandated body watching over the industry. This harms their customers and compromises national security by exposing all nationals to security threats.

Over the past years, security enterprises have been comfortable working in obscurity areas, further from the critical examination and accountability of the community. Their security personnel and administration team do not need to be accredited, skilled, and approved to engage in security services. In the process, they are co-opted by political or vigilante groups and thus become involved in criminal activity. The absence of regulation means a lack of the quality control measures mandated to do routine and random inspections. Lack of oversight greatly impairs the quality of service offered and may negatively impact people's security and property in the long run. Observation has it that failure to develop mechanisms to ensure effective oversight of the industry has consequences, including CSFs being vulnerable to organised crime and unethical behaviour [6; 24]. In short, the regulation and licensing acknowledge that part of the security specialist's duty has to circumvent any standard of lawbreaking and insecurity.

Security Personnel are not Adequately Trained

59 (15.8%) respondents mentioned security personnel not being adequately trained. The developmental training of security personnel is an ongoing concern of the consumers. A general public respondent explained: *"From the inconsistency of how the security personnel perform their duties, it is evident that they are not adequately trained"*.

During the scheduled interviews, a consumer security manager was asked about the different ways security personnel undertake their duties, even on similar assignments. He had this to say: *"It seems like the security guards are not well trained for their tasks. In most instances, we delegate the ones who have been with us longer to train the newcomers"*.

There is a perception that security guards are not adequately trained, leading to a lack of uniformity and consistency in their responsibility. Inadequately trained security personnel are poorly equipped and sloppy in the appropriate methods of security, well-being and circumstances alertness, which is disadvantageous to the achievement of an organisation.

Inadequately trained guards are more susceptible to harm, and insecurity as their undertakings lead to errors and repetition of work. They spend considerable time seeking help to perform their jobs, whereas others perform tasks to their understanding, detrimental to the security process. The lack of adequate knowledge and skills to provide satisfactory security service results in people's compromised security and properties. This is corroborated that inadequate training leaves the guards prone to more mistakes that put the public at risk [13].

To save time, some security firms delegate the task of training to guards who have been on the job longer. However, these guards are often not given extra time to do so, as they still need to accomplish their duties. When more experienced guards spend time monitoring their unskilled colleagues, it is a distraction from their work, affecting their security provision output. So they rush the training process and sometimes leave it up to the guard to ask questions, therefore compromising security provision for their customers. The same concern has been raised in other papers that noted that there was a concern that commercial security officers were receiving less training which most of the time was found to be on-job training [3; 14].

From the field observations (Table 2), five out of 12 appeared not knowledgeable in their duties. Hence, there is a need for adequate training to be at par with the other seven (58.4%).

Table 2 – Observational checklists Results

Responsibilities	Could Improve	Acceptable	Excellent	Not Observed*
Equipment kitting	5	7	0	0
Guards – Public interaction	6	3	3	0
Appears knowledgeable	5	6	1	0

The lack of proper training given to security personnel apart from putting the security personnel's life in harm's way also places the establishments where they are deployed and the employees available in jeopardy. Rather than mitigating risks, inadequately trained security personnel would inadvertently heighten the danger of people and assets.

The findings of this study have indicated that lack of courtesy by guards, security personnel that are not adequately trained, not being armed with firearms, poor working conditions of guards, lack of regulation and licensing, and lack of trust by the state security agencies, are the impediments to the success of commercial security contribution on the national security. There is a need for the commercial security industry, the state security agencies, the regulator and the customers to improve their knowledge on the nature of these limitations so that the benefits to national security are not undermined. With the inside, the limits can be overcome and thereby enhance the impact of the commercial security industry on national security.

The study sought to find out the limitations of commercialised security to impact national security in Nairobi County, Kenya, positively. It revealed that not being armed with firearms prevents commercialised security personnel from confronting armed criminals. This greatly limits their successful contribution to national security. The study also found poor working conditions, including being overworked fatigue in the guards. Allowances not being paid and lack of job security were also poor working conditions. Both of these affect the performance of the commercial security personnel, whose efficiency and effectiveness decreases, thereby denting the industry. It also came out that lack of being courteous by the commercialised security's personnel limits the contribution of the industry on national security.

For this reason, it eliminates goodwill from the citizens who are supposed to cooperate and collaborate while being served. There is, therefore, a lack of sharing of information that would ensure that security is achieved. Lack of trust with the state security agencies was another limitation revealed by the study. This eliminates the opportunities for information-sharing by the security stakeholders in the fight against crime. It eliminates the opportunities to collaborate and cooperate. Another limitation found was the lack of

enforcement of regulations and licensing. The Private Security Regulation Authority has not enforced rules and licensing.

Consequently, the PSRA, No.13 of 2016, needs to be put in operation to accountability this industry that has an immense burden bestowed on it. Last but not least, the study revealed that not being properly and adequately trained limited the impact of commercial security on national security. Inadequate training leads to errors and distraction of the more experienced colleagues, resulting in insufficient security services.

CONCLUSIONS

The limitations of commercialised security impact on national security bring the industry's hurdles to the fore. Consequently, the country should have favourable mechanisms to oversee the industry's continuous reevaluation. The promising means can only be realised through the stakeholders' consultation: the commercial security industry, the citizens and the state.

The Private Security Regulation Authority needs to start implementing some of the requirements in the PSRA No 13 of 2016, which are meant to streamline the industry in terms of the training of the security guards, remunerations of the security guards, minimum requirements for recruitment and working environments. This is so that the country and citizens can benefit from the basis on which the authority was formed.

Section 53 of the PSRA Act Amendment prohibits using arms by commercial security personnel. This would allow the security guards to be armed with firearms to enable them to match and even outmatch the current challenge of armed criminals. The regulator and the private security providers need to make modalities on how the same can be implemented not to become a source of insecurity for the citizens. Still, instead, it should enhance and contribute positively to national security.

The study also recommends that the consumers use the platform created by the PSRA No. 13 of 2016 to express their limitations to the PSRA authority. They should also make known to the authority of their expectations.

Based on the scope and the findings for this study, the following are recommendations for future research:

1. The research limited itself to the commercialised security in Nairobi City County. However, some similarities in the industry were noted, primarily through literature. It would be helpful to extend this study to other counties to determine to what extent the findings are applicable in Kenya.

2. There should be a study to assess the limitation of the commercialised security industry to positively impact national security exclusively from the perspectives of the state security agencies in Kenya. These would include the police and other state security organs. It would add a new view of the other parties' perception of their fellow fighters against insecurity.

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